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Matsushitaand the Role of Economists with
Regard to Proof of Conspiracy
DanielR. Shulman*
Now that Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.'
has had twenty years to mature, it is apparent that economists have an
important role to play in providing testimony on issues relating to the
presence or absence of concerted action. That role, however, is not
without significant limitations, which must be carefully observed if the
economic testimony is to have value, relevance, and admissibility as
"having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
2
probable than it would be without the evidence."
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.3 teaches that to make a
submissible case, "the antitrust plaintiff should present direct or
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the . . .
[defendants] 'had a conscious commitment to a common scheme
designed to achieve an unlawful objective."' In addition, "[t]here must
be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the
[defendants] were acting independently." 4 Matsushita proceeds from
these premises to add two further principles. First, "conduct as
consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does
not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy." 5 In
other words, in antitrust, the tie goes to the fielder, not the runner.
Second, "if the factual context renders respondents' claim
implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no economic
sense-respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence
6
to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."

Daniel R. Shulman is a member of Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett,
P.A.'s antitrust, trial
practice, and complex litigation groups, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2. FED. R. EVID. 401.
3. 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984).
4. Id.
5. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
6. Id. at 587.
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Under these principles, testimony by economists on issues of
concerted action has played a leading role in antitrust litigation,
sometimes for the better (e.g., In re High Fructose Corn Syrup 7) and
sometimes for the worse (e.g., Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip-Morris
U.S.A.8). The role of economic evidence on issues of concerted action
has also figured prominently in current antitrust scholarship. 9 The
Sedona Conference has established a working group, which produced a
report, The Role of Economics in Antitrust,10 suggesting practice
principles for the use of economic evidence in antitrust litigation. This
report contains supporting analysis and commentary, including
guidelines for economics and proof of concerted action. 1 1
THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM

As the foregoing cases and articles demonstrate, economics has a role
in deciding issues of concerted action primarily because of what has
come to be known as "the oligopoly problem." In relatively highly
concentrated industries, which dominate much of the domestic and
world economy, the phenomenon of conscious parallelism results in
firms' coordinating their behavior based on their knowledge of what
other firms are doing and their anticipation of what other firms will do.
The question is whether and under what circumstances a finder of fact
should be able to infer agreement from such parallel conduct. Although
this is ultimately a legal question, it rests heavily on economic theory.
The most commonly accepted economic doctrine is that in an
oligopoly setting agreement is unnecessary to produce consciously
parallel conduct and that it would be irrational to infer agreement from
parallel conduct alone. 12 In 1969, however, Professor Richard A.
Posner, now Judge Posner, presented a differing view. Posner argued
that interdependence alone was inadequate to explain parallel conduct,
3
which, he posited, could well involve some element of agreement.'
7. 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
8. 346 F.3d 1287 (llth Cir. 2003).
9. Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling
Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719 (2004).
10. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GROUP ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN
ANTITRUST, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN
ANTITRUST LAW (Feb. 2006), availableat http://www.thesedonaconference.org.
11. Much of the discussion in this commentary is based on this chapter in THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP REPORT, of which this commentator was the principal author.

12. The seminal formulation of this view appears in Donald F. Turner, The Definition of
Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L.

REv. 655 (1962).
13.

Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
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Posner has amplified and refined his thesis in subsequent scholarship
14
and judicial opinions.
Under the present state of the law, conscious parallelism alone is
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact that the defendants
acted pursuant to an agreement. 15 In addition, there must be one or
more "plus factors," evidence that tends to exclude the possibility of
independent action by the alleged conspirators. 16 Unfortunately, there
appears to be a great deal of uncertainty and variability in the case law
as to what evidence is sufficient to constitute a plus factor enabling
17
evidence of consciously parallel conduct to go to the jury.
EVIDENCE OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR

In cases involving consciously parallel conduct, parties on both sides
have increasingly offered expert economic testimony, principally of two
kinds. First, there is evidence of market structure, which analyzes the
features of an industry that render it more or less conducive to
agreement or cartel-like behavior, such as concentration, barriers to
entry, nature of the product, availability of pricing information, ease of
policing an agreement, capacity utilization, and other factors that may
make agreement desirable or practicable, or undesirable or
impracticable.
Second, there is evidence of market performance,
defined as the behavior of competitors in the industry and whether it is
indicative of competition or collusion. Such evidence may include:
"fixed relative market shares," "market-wide price discrimination,"
"exchanges of price information," "regional price variations," "identical
8
bids," past express price-fixing, and "exclusionary practices."'
The question is whether and under what circumstances expert
economic testimony on these subjects can be helpful in deciding the
question of whether there is sufficient evidence of unlawful agreement

REv. 1562 (1969).
14. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002). RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE ch. 4 (1976) [hereinafter POSNER, 1976];
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW ch. 3 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter POSNER, 2001].

15.

Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954).

16. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 222-27 (1939); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co.
v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952); Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000,

1007-08 (9th Cir. 1965); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1987); In re
Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627,634 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. Compare DiMauro, 822 F.2d at 253-54, C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 197 F.2d at 493, and

Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 673 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), with In re
Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004), Williamson Oil v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2002).
18. POSNER, 2001, supra note 14, at 79-93.
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to go to a jury. The answer is that, properly limited, economic evidence
of both market structure and behavior is relevant and should be
admissible on the issue of agreement vel non.
With regard to market structure, expert economic testimony generally
has something to offer on whether the plaintiff's theory of conspiracy is
plausible or implausible, a factor that may have an effect on the
quantum of proof required to raise a triable jury issue.1 9 Conspiracy is
more plausible in markets characterized by high concentration, entry
barriers, fungible products, excess capacity, high fixed costs, ready
20
access to pricing information, and many small customers or suppliers.
Conversely, concerted action is less plausible in industries marked by
lack of concentration, low entry barriers, differentiated products, low
fixed costs, high capacity utilization, large customers or suppliers, and
In such markets,
difficulty of ascertaining pricing information.
incentives to cheat on a conspiracy are great, and detection and policing
of cheaters difficult. Economists should be permitted to present
evidence on these structural features where they may be relevant to
gauging the plausibility or implausibility of the theories of the case.
Nonetheless, courts must examine such evidence carefully to ascertain
whether it truly explains and is logically connected with the conduct
that is at issue in the case, and the economist must explain why and how
structural evidence relates to behavior of firms in the industry and
provides a basis for inferring that actions are consistent or inconsistent
Finally, such structural evidence can never be
with agreement.
in itself to prove or disprove the presence or
conclusive
sufficient or
absence of agreement. Its value is only in its tendency to add force to,
or detract from, other evidence of agreement or its absence.
Expert economic evidence of market behavior should also be
admissible when properly limited, explained, and tied to the facts of the
case. Unlike evidence of market structure, however, some evidence of
market behavior may be sufficient to take a case to the jury on the issue
of agreement. In his antitrust treatise, Posner lists fourteen types of
evidence of market performance that are probative in his view of the
existence of agreement, 2 1 and he discusses others in Fructose.2 2 Some
of these are relatively uncontroversial (such as identical bids; constant
market shares in a period of rising demand; higher prices during the

19.
20.
59.
21.
22.

In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 661; In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 357-58.
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 656-58; In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 358POSNER, 2001,supra note 14, at 79-83.
295 F.3d at 658-61.
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period of the alleged conspiracy than before or after). Others are
subject to debate in the economic literature (such as profit levels; price
discrimination; past antitrust violations; exchanges of pricing
information). An economist testifying on market performance should
clearly articulate the theory supporting the claim that an aspect of
market performance tends to prove or disprove the existence of
independent conduct, and then must apply the theory to the specific
facts of the case before the court.
THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA

There is, moreover, one particular area of market behavior where
economists can add real value. This is the question of when parties
have been acting in a manner that would be contrary to their
independent economic self-interest in the absence of an agreement-a
circumstance that is often listed as an important plus factor. Here,
modem oligopoly theory is able to apply the teachings of game theory
23
and the Prisoners' Dilemma.
In the Prisoners' Dilemma, prisoners A and B, accused of the same
crime, are held in isolation, unable to communicate with each other.
Each is told that if he implicates the other, who remains silent, he will
go free, while the other will receive a substantial penalty, say a ten-year
sentence. Each is also told that if each accuses the other of the crime,
then both will receive an intermediate penalty, say a five-year sentence.
Finally, each is told that if both remain silent, both will receive a much
lighter penalty, say a three-year sentence. The insight of game theory is
that in the absence of prior agreement, express or tacit, each prisoner's
informing on the other will become
a dominant strategy, because of the
24
potential cost of not doing so.
The Prisoners' Dilemma provides a starting point and conceptual
framework for analyzing competitive behavior in an oligopoly setting.
Although few competitive scenarios may actually present a Prisoners'
Dilemma, economic theory has something important to say about all
those scenarios that do not. In the Prisoners' Dilemma, informing is a
dominant strategy, in the sense that if one prisoner went first and the
other prisoner were able to observe the action of the first prisoner, the
second prisoner would inform no matter what the first prisoner did.
Hardly any competitive scenarios have such dominant strategies,
because most competitive situations are not one-shot interactions, like
the Prisoners' Dilemma, but involve repeated and continuing
23. Werden, supra note 9, at 720-34.
24. Id. at 727-29.
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interactions among firms over time. Thus, an expert economist can
often persuasively rebut a claim that conduct has been contrary to
independent self-interest by showing that the paradigm of the Prisoners'
Dilemma does not apply to the facts of the case, and therefore the
conduct cannot be assumed to be the result of agreement in the legal
sense.
Conversely, there may be instances where an economist may be able
to say that conduct does fit the Prisoners' Dilemma and is therefore
consistent with agreement. For example, if firms in an oligopoly have
increased prices simultaneously, where there is an irreversible penalty
from an unsuccessful attempt to lead or follow a price increase (e.g., the
permanent loss of important customers if other firms do not match),
then an economist may be able to testify that no rational firm would
have initiated or matched the price increase in the absence of agreement
that all firms would match.
Hence, undertaking such conduct
independently would be contrary to economic self-interest, but rational
if the firms had reached agreement.
Modem oligopoly theory can thus provide a sound economic basis
for finding the presence or absence of this plus factor, action contrary to
self-interest in the absence of agreement. This is indeed potentially a
valuable contribution, which may help bring order and clarity to an area
of law much confused at present. Such testimony therefore ought to be
admissible when the underlying theory is clearly explained and
accurately applied to the facts of the case.
Nor should courts be scared off from such testimony because of its
complex and esoteric nature, or the difficulty of making it intelligible to
a jury. This is the responsibility of counsel and the expert economist. If
they cannot make the evidence clear and comprehensible, then they
should suffer the consequence of its exclusion, but only because of their
failure of presentation, not because of the testimony's unreliability.
THE DEFINITION OF AGREEMENT

An important principle underlying every aspect of the expert
economist's testimony is that the testimony must adhere to the
definition of agreement being followed and applied in the case in which
the economist is testifying. As self-evident as this may seem, expert
economists have run aground because of their failure to comply with
it. 25 Perhaps the most common reason for this failure of proof is the
economist's and counsel's failure to recognize that the definition of

25.

Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris, 346 F.3d 1287, 1317, 1322-23 (11th Cir. 2003).
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agreement is a legal and not an economic matter. In the first and last
instance, the court defines what constitutes an agreement, regardless of
what the economist might think and economic theory might say. This
means that the economist must be sensitive to what has been said by the
particular court in which the economist is testifying.
Unfortunately, the state of the law on what constitutes agreement is
nowhere near as clear as it could be. The "conscious commitment to a
common scheme," which constitutes agreement, purports to be a
restatement of existing law, and not a new formulation or definition of
agreement under the antitrust laws. Under pre-Monsanto Supreme
Court precedent, "It is not necessary to find an express agreement in
order to find a conspiracy. It is enough that a concert of action is
contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the arrangement. ' 26
In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court held,
"Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an
invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which,
if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to
27
establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act."
Up to the time of Monsanto, lower courts construed these precedents
as allowing for wide latitude in finding unlawful agreement based on
28
conduct, which might or might not include verbal communication.
Indeed, even after Monsanto these rules have retained a measure of
29
vitality.
Commentators and at least one court have asked whether section 1 is
broad enough "to encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix prices, that
is, an agreement made without any communication among the
parties," 30 and, if not, the nature and extent of the communication that
31
must exist for an unlawful agreement under the Sherman Act.
Since Monsanto and Matsushita, however, courts appear to have
become significantly more rigorous in what they will require in order to
26. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948); Lawlor v. Loewe,
209 F. 721, 725 (2d Cir. 1913), affid, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
27. 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
28. Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1965) ("Written assurances ...
are unnecessary. So are oral assurances, if a course of conduct, or a price schedule, once
suggested or outlined by a competitor in the presence of other competitors, is followed by allgenerally and customarily-and continuously for all practical purposes, even though there be
slight variations."); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1952)
("Proof of a formal agreement is unnecessary, and were the law otherwise such conspiracies
would flourish; profit rather than punishment, would be the reward.").
29. Toys R Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000).
30. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002).
31. See Werden, supra note 9, at 734-59.
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find a submissible issue on the question of agreement. Applying the
principles that the evidence must tend to exclude the possibility of independent conduct, and that evidence equally consistent with independent
conduct cannot prove agreement, courts increasingly regard evidence of
32
opportunity and motive to conspire as nonprobative of agreement.
Regrettable as the lack of clarity in the law may be, the expert
economist is nonetheless charged with knowing the legal definition
applicable to the matter in which the economist is testifying. The price
of ignorance may well be exclusion of the testimony, as indeed it should
be.
EVIDENCE OF PAST ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS

Finally, one type of evidence that has not received its due
consideration, in the view of this commentator, is past violations by the
defendants involving the same kinds of unlawful agreements charged in
the case currently before the court. For example, the instant case may
involve a charge of price-fixing by firms in an oligopolistic industry,
and there may be evidence that these same firms have been found to
have agreed to fix prices on one or more occasions in the past.
In his treatise, Posner identifies such past price fixing as a factor
showing that a market is susceptible of supporting an illegal pricing
conspiracy. 3 3 There is a valid argument that this is powerful evidence
tending to exclude the possibility of independent action, not only for the
reason cited by Posner. Theorists have proposed that conscious
parallelism alone can produce supracompetitive pricing in a
concentrated market. 34 Evidence of past price fixing by express or
implied agreement, however, shows that firms cannot achieve
noncompetitive pricing solely through conscious parallelism. As
rational actors, they would not enter into an illegal price-fixing
agreement if they could achieve the same result legally solely through
conscious parallelism. Hence, evidence of past price fixing strongly
excludes the possibility that present price uniformity results merely

32. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 346 F.3d 1287, 1319 (lth Cir. 2003) ("Indeed,
the opportunity to fix prices without any showing that appellees actually conspired does not tend
to exclude the possibility that they did not avail themselves of such opportunity or, conversely,
that they actually did conspire.") (emphasis in original); United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d
161,165-66 (2d Cir. 2002).
33. POSNER, 2001, supra note 14, at 79 ("In a market in which collusion is attractive we can

expect a history of attempts at express collusion, some of which may have been detected by the
antitrust enforcers.").
34. Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: ParallelPricing, the Oligopoly
Problem, and ContemporaryEconomic Theory 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 147 (Spring 1993).
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from conscious parallelism. At the very least, it significantly enhances
the plausibility of the plaintiffs' theory, argues against any
augmentation of the plaintiffs' burden of proof in surviving summary
judgment, and fortifies plus factors suggesting agreement.
In some of its landmark antitrust cases, the United States Supreme
Court has reviewed a past history of antitrust violations and concluded
with its oft-repeated admonition, "Size carries with it an opportunity for
when the opportunity is proved to have
abuse that is not to be ignored
35
been utilized in the past."
Obviously such evidence of past violations may be so inflammatory
as to evoke a challenge under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. This
should not, however, cause the court to ignore the probative value of the
evidence on the crucial economic issue of whether the structure of the
market involved is sufficiently oligopolistic so that conscious
parallelism alone can be expected to produce supracompetitive identical
pricing by the defendants. If defendants in the past felt the need to
resort to agreement to fix prices, this should be powerful and admissible
evidence that they recognized that conscious parallelism and the
structure of the market alone would not yield the same prices, and that
they would need to achieve such prices by illegal agreement. This
evidence of past violations truly does tend to exclude the possibility that
defendants acted independently, and does so consistently with sound
economic theory.

35. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 796 (1946) (quoting United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932)); see also United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107
n.10 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).

